I received a response from Van
Chevrolet. Unfortunately, it was from their lawyer. Here it is
in jpeg form, click
here to read it as a .pdf (note my further analysis below):



Needless to say, I disagree with their legal analysis. The courts
have already addressed this issue and frankly, there really is not much
they can say. I am allowed to express my opinion. There is no
confusion. For those that want a specific cite, click on the following case:
The
Taubman Co. v. Webfeats
, No. 01-72987 (E.D.
Mich.
Oct. 11, 2001) (granting preliminary injunction), rev'd, 319 F.3d 770 (6th
Cir. 2003).
This
is a summary of the case:
Plaintiff,
a shopping-mall builder and owner of the marks TAUBMAN and THE SHOPS AT
WILLOWS BEND marks, objected to defendant’s use of the domain names
“shopsatwillowsbend.com” for a website providing information about
plaintiff’s shopping mall called “The Shops at Willow Bend.”
Defendant’s website included a prominent disclaimer of affiliation with
plaintiff, stating that the site was unofficial and providing a link to
plaintiff’s official website. Defendant’s site also provided
links to the sites for defendant’s web-design company and a third party
selling custom-made shirts. After plaintiff filed suit regarding the
domain name “shopsatwillowsbend.com,” defendant registered five
“.sucks” domain names containing plaintiff’s marks TAUBMAN or THE
SHOPS AT WILLOW BEND or variations thereof, including
“taubmansucks.com” and “theshopsatwillowbendsucks.com.” All
of defendant’s “sucks” domain names linked to a website about its
legal dispute with plaintiff. The district court granted both
plaintiff’s initial motion for preliminary injunction enjoining
defendant from using the domain name “shopsatwillowsbend.com” and
plaintiff’s amended motion for preliminary injunction enjoining
defendant’s use of the “sucks” domain names. Both injunctions
were based on plaintiff’s trademark-infringement claim.
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, and dissolved
both preliminary injunctions. Regarding the
“shopsatwillowsbend.com” website, defendant argued that his use was
noncommercial speech entitled to First Amendment protection and that there
was no likelihood of confusion. In response, plaintiff argued that
defendant was using the name commercially to sell or advertise goods or
services based on: (a) the link on defendant’s site to the custom-made
shirt website, (b) the link on defendant’s site to defendant’s own
web-design company, and (c) defendant’s alleged acceptance of a $1,000
offer to transfer the domain name to plaintiff. The appeals court,
however, rejected all three arguments. The link to the custom-made
shirt website was removed prior to the injunction and defendant sent a
letter to plaintiff’s attorneys stating that it would not place any
advertising of any kind on the website in the future. The Sixth
Circuit concluded that as long as defendant had “no commercial links”
on its site, defendant was making “no use [of plaintiff’s mark] in
connection with the advertising’ of goods and services” sufficient to
enjoin defendant under the Lanham Act. Plaintiff’s argument that
its offer to buy the domain name qualified defendant’s use of the name
as “in connection with the sale of goods” had no merit because
defendant was not a cybersquatter who had a business of registering
trademark-related domain names and there was no evidence that
defendant’s initial motive in registering the
“shopsatwillowsbend.com” domain name was to resell it. Indeed,
contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, the record suggested that it was
plaintiff who initiated the bargaining process to acquire the domain name.
Even if defendant’s use of the “shopsatwillowsbend.com” domain name
was commercial in nature, it would not be actionable under the Lanham Act
because it did not create a likelihood of confusion among the consuming
public based in large part on the disclaimer defendant placed on its
website. Not only did defendant place a disclaimer of affiliation
with plaintiff on its website but it placed a hyperlink to plaintiff’s
website within the disclaimer. Accordingly, defendant’s website
and disclaimer actually helped plaintiff by redirecting potential lost
customers of plaintiff to plaintiff’s official website. Turning to
the injunction against the “sucks” domain names, the Sixth Circuit
held that defendant’s use of plaintiff’s marks in the “sucks”
domain names was “purely an exhibition of Free Speech. . . .”
The court treated plaintiff’s concession that defendant was “free to
shout” ‘Taubman Sucks!’ from the roof tops” as a concession that
defendant was free to use its “sucks” domain names because “[t]he
roof tops of our past have evolved into the internet domain names of our
present. We find that the domain name is a type of public
expression, no different in scope than a billboard or a pulpit . . . .”
The Sixth Circuit distinguished this case from the Planned
Parenthood case where “the defendant used the
plaintiff’s trade name as a domain name, without the qualifying moniker
‘sucks,’ or any other such addendum to indicate that the plaintiff was
not the proprietor of the website.” In this case, however, the
addition of the word “sucks” removed “any confusion as to source.”
Finally, plaintiff argued that under the “Safe Distance Rule,”
defendant should not be able to use the “sucks” domain names even
though they might not necessarily be actionable on their own because
defendant earlier infringed plaintiff’s trademark by using the
“shopsatwillowsbend.com” domain name. The Sixth Circuit held
that even if the Safe Distance Rule survived the enactment of the Lanham
Act, it did not apply here because: (a) the rule applies only where the
second use was commercial and was only a “slight deviation” of the
first use, and (b) the rule applies only against “proven infringers,”
and the Sixth Circuit held that the “shopsatwillowsbend.com” domain
name did not infringe plaintiff’s trademark rights.